A recent article titled "Will the regime fall, as the roof fell?" by my dear colleague Stefan Gužvica was published on the website of the Annals of the Croatian Political Science Association (Gužvica, 2025). While I am a great admirer of his—unfortunately, still insufficiently recognized—sense of humor, I believe that, in this article, his sharp irony has taken up too large a share of his analysis of the socio-political situation in Serbia over the past three-and-a-bit months. Here, I will present several methodological problems which I believe hinder Gužvica's reasoning, without contesting his political perspective and end goals.
I would argue that the root problem arises when Gužvica immediately frames the discussion in "world-historical terms." Like it or not, to observe and evaluate a process from a world-historical standpoint, we must assume not only the telos of world history but also the processual trajectory from the present to the realization of that telos. Since this processual trajectory is composed of an immeasurable number of variables, we must implicitly answer a whole series of questions to which we simply do not have answers. By the force of logic, this method leads us to conclusions based on unverified assumptions. Not without reason, Hegel states in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right that "the owl of Minerva takes flight at dusk" (Hegel, 1989).
The second mistake Gužvica makes concerns the question of organization and has three aspects that I will highlight. Commenting on the organization of students through plenums, he argues: "Due to the low level of political education and organization among students, it seems that no one was aware of anything that happened in the past sixty years." Following my first critique, here it seems that Gužvica conceptualizes world history through a linear progression, as a sequence of irreversible events. This reveals a fundamentally rationalist perspective, which in itself is not problematic, but the question is whether it is applicable to a subject matter that is very much alive—namely, to a historical process that has not yet unfolded entirely.
Simply put, insisting on the rational and conceptual neglects insights unavailable to this apparatus—empirical evidence that is not only rational but also based on emotion. The rationalist reduction that Gužvica applies would be possible and justified if the sun had set on the student movement and Minerva's owl had taken flight. However, while the metaphorical students' day is still ongoing and the logic of protest is evolving, his approach overlooks a crucial constitutive element of that logic—the overcoming of fear, which transcends the boundaries of the student generation.
Furthermore, Gužvica states that plenums "mostly engage in the habitual waste of time," which he assumes "has helped Vučić since their very existence at least somewhat applies the brakes to the student movement." Here, he makes a serious logical error. Earlier in the text, he correctly points out that Serbia lacks an organizational structure for the labor movement with the capacity to articulate class politics. To this, we can add that neither the so-called civic opposition, let alone students, have the organizational infrastructure to keep the movement alive after the initial mobilization. Braking, as we empirically know from a series of student and labor strikes worldwide, plays a crucial role in building a functional organization in the background which ensures that the energy of protests does not burn out in rapid mobilization, only for the situation to revert to its pre-protest state.
In this case, given the development and expansion of first the student faculty blockades and then the accompanying (civic, labor, farmer) protests, one could argue precisely the opposite of Gužvica. Namely, that the slow pace of the student movement has weakened support for the regime and facilitated the development of a mass movement. And the movement in Serbia is indeed massive, as evidenced by the map compiled by former journalist Bojan Radović (@amfibolije, 2025) and data gathered by the Archive of Public Gatherings (Arhiv javnih skupova, 2025). Arhiv javnih skupova (2025).
This brings us to the question: what comes next? Here, Gužvica continues with a series of assumptions and hypothetical conclusions, offering predictions of what Serbia might look like under scenarios where Vučić either remains in power or loses it. How important is this? How reliable is it? First and foremost, we must be extremely cautious in predicting domestic political developments in Serbia. We are unfamiliar with the internal dynamics of the student movement in the three major university centers (Novi Sad, Belgrade, Niš), nor do we know the internal dynamics of the SNS leadership and its relationships with local SNS branches. We are also unaware of the details of power struggles within various state agencies. Thus, if Gužvica will forgive my comparison, the difference between his predictions and the TV show of Milan the Clairvoyant is that Milan is joking.
Second, Gužvica speculates rather freely about foreign policy influences on the situation and Serbia’s future orientation (regardless of whether the current regime survives). In doing so, he assumes, in my view mistakenly, that he can predict the actions of the new US administration as well as the stance of a potential new Serbian government towards the EU. Considering the support Vučić has received in recent months from key foreign backers (primarily the EU and the US, followed by Russia and China), we see a certain resentment developing within the protest movement toward these actors. How widespread and intense is this resentment? Let us be honest—we have no idea at this moment. But precisely for that reason, we cannot reduce the future course of events to the following mantra: the pro-EU opposition will take power and fully align Serbia with Euro-Atlantic integration. Not only do we not know what the domestic political dynamics will look like after a potential change in power, but we also do not know what Euro-Atlantic integration will look like after the first few months of Trump’s administration.
The biggest mistake Gužvica makes is ignoring the social novelties that the current student and mass social movement has brought to Serbia. Looking again at Radović’s map, we see that there is no municipality in Serbia where a protest has not yet taken place. When students brought 100,000 people to Slavija at the end of the last year, few believed they could achieve more. However, they then conducted a full-day blockade of Belgrade’s Autokomanda, a two-day march to Novi Sad, and a 27-hour blockade of the Freedom Bridge in Novi Sad. While we analyze past activities, this "primitive, superficial, and pre-political form of self-organization" is preparing actions to mark the 190th anniversary of the "Sretenje Constitution." The generation that leads this movement, as Svetlana Slapšak argues (Slapšak, 2025), has passed its "rite of passage." This generation’s political socialization is drastically different from previous generations.
It is characterized by a tremendous expansion of social interactions. At first, as we saw, citizens approached the movement individually, then some unions and professional associations and even some small entrepreneurs joined. While it may be true that their initial position was one of atomized and unorganized individuals—alienated, if we use Marxist terminology—we must acknowledge that this alienation has been overcome through the actions of this movement. Furthermore, if we are to discuss the place and role of the organized working class within this movement, we cannot ignore the fact that the student movement does not prohibit labor unions from attending protests under their own banners while it does prohibit this for other associations and opposition political parties.
Therefore, if we wish to speak about articulating the working class position within the existing mass movement, the question is not how to "attract someone to Marxist ideas." If we wish to talk about articulating the class positions of the working class within this mass movement, the real question is how to strengthen the labor movement in terms of actions and organizational structure within the existing movement, and how to build a social structure on a labor platform that will outlive the inevitable end of the protests. Trade unionism in Serbia now has the opportunity to emancipate itself from the union bureaucracy and take part in building a new social contract. In doing so, it can correct the mistake it made in 2000, when DOS (Democratic Opposition of Serbia) took advantage of trade unions to overthrow the government, only to betray and sell them out afterward. However, this responsibility cannot fall on students or their individual supporters. It must be assumed by the organizers and organizations of the working class.
References
@amfibolije. 2025. "Bolje ne ustaj, Aco, dete mamino, izašla nova #MapaProtesta i na njoj sve crveno." X (bivši Twitter), 8. veljače 2025. https://x.com/amfibolije/status/1888087131001967001.
Arhiv javnih skupova. 2025. "Mesta u kojima su održane akcije posle rušenja nadstrešnice." Arhiv javnih skupova, 1. veljače 2025. https://javniskupovi.org/index.php/2025/02/01/gradovi-u-kojima-je-odrzana-akcija-zastani-srbijo/.
Gužvica, Stefan. 2025. "Od pada nadstrešnice do pada režima?" Blog Anala hrvatskog politološkog društva. 4. veljače 2025. https://analihpd.hr/od-pada-nadstrešnice-do-pada-rezima/.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1989. Osnovne crte filozofije prava: s Hegelovim vlastoručnim marginama u njegovu priručnom primjerku Filozofije prava. Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša.
Slapšak, Svetlana. 2025. "300.000 x 2." Peščanik, 5. veljače 2025. https://pescanik.net/300-000-x-2/.
