Trump and the Rise of Racist Internationalism: A view from South Africa

Introduction

I spent the first three months of my retirement from formal higher education in South Africa, a period that coincided with the first three months of the second mandate of Donald J. Trump as President of the United States. Even in the context of a flurry of policy pronouncements, and clear signals that this was not going to be “business as usual”, I did not expect the early days of Trump 2.0 to be so focused on South Africa. The early announcement of cutting all US support to South Africa was, of course, linked to the more general decimation of the US development‑aid budget, uncertainty over the renewal of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (Office of the United States Trade Representative 2025), and also a kind of retribution for the South African government’s bringing of a genocide case to the International Court of Justice regarding Israel’s actions in Gaza. At the same time, offering asylum to white Afrikaners, supposedly under threat from land confiscation, described in a social‑media post by Trump as “a massive Human Rights VIOLATION” (Trump 2025, capitals in original), appeared both surprising and, certainly, in need of explanation.

Understanding the Reaction to the Expropriation Act

The indictment of the South African government for “treating certain classes of people VERY BADLY” (Trump 2025, capitals in original) and the offer of asylum were a direct response to the 2024 Expropriation Act (law 13‑2024) signed by President Cyril Ramaphosa on 23 January 2025 (Republic of South Africa 2025). The law replaced a 1975 apartheid‑era statute and was the culmination of decades of struggle around land reform. Despite its title, it decreed that expropriation could be used only as a last resort, in the public interest, with compensation to be decided on a fair basis and subject to judicial review. The law was intended to free up land that had been abandoned by any private owner, regardless of skin colour, so that it could be repurposed for infrastructure projects, public services including housing, or environmental protection. It can hardly be said to have been hastily introduced, since apartheid was dismantled in 1994, nor was it ever likely to lead to immediate large‑scale repossession.

Why such intense interest from the Trump regime? The influence of Elon Musk, at least before his very public falling‑out with Trump, should not be understated. Musk—born in Pretoria in 1971, with a Canadian grandfather who moved to South Africa because he found apartheid attractive—spent his formative years in privileged white environments, leaving in 1989 as the regime’s crisis peaked. Musk has long portrayed post‑apartheid South Africa as “openly racist”, even suggesting that killings of white farmers amount to genocide (Savage 2025). His complaints that telecom rules requiring 30 percent Black ownership have blocked Starlink need scepticism, not least because he apparently never applied for an operating permit (Ngcobo 2025).

Equally important are the long‑term efforts of the Afrikaner white‑supremacist group AfriForum, which began lobbying US conservative circles in 2017. On their 2018 visit Trump embraced conspiracy theories claiming white farmers face government‑led violence (Mbembe & Gilmore 2025). After the Expropriation Act passed, AfriForum pledged to combine domestic legal challenges with a “targeted campaign” aimed at “international players”, especially the Trump regime (Thamm 2025). CEO Kallie Kriel said their concern is less expropriation than land grabbing, while comparing South Africa’s law with those of Zimbabwe and Venezuela; he added that Trump also had Afrikaner education issues in mind (Haffajee 2025).

Seeking and Getting Asylum

By mid‑March 2025 more than 67 000 white South Africans had expressed interest in resettlement, registering with the South African Chamber of Commerce in the United States, which passed the list to the US Embassy in Pretoria. Most registrants were 25–45 years old with two or three dependants (Jones & Simelane 2025). Many simply sought better opportunities. About 8 000 official applications were lodged, and US authorities identified roughly 100 that might be approved.

The first 59 Afrikaners granted refugee status arrived in the United States on 12 May 2025 and were welcomed at Dulles International Airport by Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Troy Edgar. Landau spoke of “harrowing stories of violence … unredressed by the authorities” and said the programme showed that “the United States rejects the egregious persecution of people on the basis of race in South Africa.” He added that “assimilation”—a synonym for whiteness—was a key factor in adjudicating the claims (O’Regan 2025).

Politics as Spectacle: Ramaphosa in the White House

Surpassing even President Volodymyr Zelensky’s ill‑fated White House visit on 28 February 2025, Cyril Ramaphosa’s visit on 21 May 2025 was a macabre display of Trump’s love of political theatre and fake news. Ramaphosa had come to repair relations after anti‑apartheid veteran Ebrahim Rasool was expelled as South Africa’s ambassador for saying in a 14 March 2025 webinar that Trump mobilises supremacism and projects white victimhood (Mistra 2025). Ramaphosa brought white golfers Ernie Els and Retief Goosen, billionaire Johann Rupert, and Agriculture Minister John Steinhuisen; the US side included Vice‑President J. D. Vance, Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, Elon Musk and others.

After opening pleasantries, the meeting became an ambush: in reply to a question on “white genocide”, Trump dimmed the lights and ran a video montage featuring Jacob Zuma and Julius Malema singing “Kill the Boer”. Ramaphosa calmly noted these were not government policy. Still more dramatic was footage of supposed “burial sites” for over 1 000 farmers. When Ramaphosa asked where the clip was filmed, Trump first said he didn’t know, then “It’s in South Africa, Mr President” (Singju Post 2025). In fact, it showed a protest on 5 September  2020 following the murder of two white farmers, the crosses were removed soon after (Thom & Kaufman 2025). Despite Ramaphosa’s composure, the Trump regime doubled down, issuing a statement titled “President Trump is Right About What’s Happening in South Africa” (The White House 2025) mixing sensationalist right‑wing claims with mainstream reports taken out of context.

Trump and the Racist International

The episode is no mere eccentricity: it legitimises a supposedly “moderate” racism spreading across the West—echoed, for example, in UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s warning that Britain risks becoming “an island of strangers”. Trump, his allies, and the broader movement openly support Germany’s neo‑Nazi AfD, Giorgia Meloni’s far‑right Italian government, and threaten punitive tariffs on Brazil unless Lula ends the “witch‑hunt” of Jair Bolsonaro. Trump thus leads a renewed Racist or Fascist International. Domestically, the regime dismantles DEI programmes, hardens borders, and detains foreign students—embodying the maxim that “the cruelty is the point” (Serwer 2021).

Jeff Maskovsky and Sophie Bjork‑James argued during Trump’s first term that authoritarian neoliberalism plus right‑wing nationalism manifests in racialised, patriarchal forms inspiring movements worldwide (Maskovsky & Bjork‑James 2020). Maskovsky stresses that constructing racialised subjects and prioritising white resentment are central to Trump’s politics (Maskovsky 2020). Bjork‑James adds that Trump seeks to unite white people globally, linking US white nationalists and evangelicals with broader neo‑fascist projects (Bjork‑James 2020). [i] Above all, the state apparatus—cast as “the swamp” or “deep state”—must, in this vision, be dismantled and rebuilt through social movements that will endure long after Trump 2.0 is history.

Meanwhile – South African Realities

More than thirty years after apartheid, South Africa remains starkly unequal and visibly divided, despite a constitution guaranteeing social rights and an assertive Constitutional Court. A Gini coefficient of 0.67 makes it the world’s most unequal country, driven by high unemployment and widespread informal‑sector poverty. Wealth inequality is even greater: roughly 3 500 individuals—0.01 percent of the population—hold about 15 percent of total wealth (Valodia 2023). Anti‑discrimination laws created a small Black elite and a modest Black middle class, both living mainly in gated communities alongside whites under private security.

Crime levels are high. The 2023‑24 murder rate was 45 per 100 000—the second highest among reporting countries (Lamb 2025)—with low detection and prosecution rates. Farm murders are relatively rare: AfriForum logged 49 in 2023‑24 (not all white victims), just 0.2 percent of all murders. Farm attacks—mostly robberies—were 296, only 0.7 percent of all robberies (Newman 2025; AfriForum 2023). Land‑ownership data are elusive because many holdings sit in trusts and companies. A 2017 audit found only 30 percent of private rural land individually owned: whites held 72 percent, “coloured” people 15 percent, “Indians” 5 percent, and “Africans” 4 percent (Walker 2025). As the ANC embraces neoliberalism and selective anti‑corruption drives, Trump’s framing of white Afrikaner farmers as apartheid’s “real victims” gains traction. His punishment of South Africa hurts both state and people, ironically nudging Pretoria towards solidarity with the rest of Africa, the Global South, BRICS+, and especially China—Trump’s chief antagonist.

References

[i] The book is available in an earlier form at the following link: https://cuny.manifoldapp.org/read/untitled-3461758b-88c6-423b-b109-2bad311801dc/section/04683947-6b45-4b55-9c14-9d7e8fb0cd32 (Accessed: 19 July 2025).