Emmanuel Macron in the Dire Straits of Political Life

How to Rule in a Declining Republic
May 12, 2022
Written by: 
Višeslav Raos
Associate Professor at the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb

After a long campaign and a dramatic first round in which three candidates won over 20 percent of the vote, Emmanuel Macron, an undeserved hero of our time, was re-elected president of the seventh largest economy in the world and the only nuclear power among the EU members. Still, the taste of Macron’s victory remains as bitter as pastis, a popular Gallic anise that was developed after the (temporary) ban on absinthe at the dawn of the First World War. When he looks back on his first five years at the Elysée Palace, he will soon have to state with regret that his great ideas have run aground. He is starting his second term in a country that is deeply polarized, and his convincing election result is more a reflection of Le Pen’s inability to win than the real support of the citizens. Finally, the upcoming parliamentary elections are more uncertain than before, opening the possibility that a group of parties supporting him will not have a majority in the National Assembly.

Macron came to the presidency five years ago full of great ideas, encouraged by the fact that, on the ruins of the weakened, once central parties of the right (Republicans) and left (Socialist Party), he established a personalized movement – a party distinctly bent on reforms.

At the domestic level, Macron managed to push through a new anti-corruption package aimed at preventing civil servants and officials from hiring on a marital and family basis. As a liberal politician, he tried to go where none of his predecessors had gone so far – to loosen the proverbial French statism and simplify and modernize labor legislation, but also to unify the fragmented pension insurance system. He was greeted by a wave of union and other protests, often violent, which is not alien to the political culture in the Hexagon. The final legal solutions were very diluted, as he still had to give in to the entrenched positions of interest group representatives.

He was also attacked by the public for being obstinate about raising environmental excise duties on diesel fuels. Namely, on the one hand, it was an attempt to reduce the carbon footprint and a reform project that was supposed to encourage changes in French society and economy, but on the other hand it reflected alienation from the problems of ordinary people who mostly felt it as a socially insensitive measure. The revolt against raising excise taxes gave birth to the so-called gilets jaunes (“yellow vests”), a protest movement of forgotten, suburban and rural France, which, unfortunately, in its later stages turned to vandalism and anti-Semitism.

Recognizing the problem of democratic deficit, and not only the social and economic component of the problem, Macron mitigated the dissatisfaction of citizens by launching a series of personal meetings with citizens and public debates in city halls to create a deliberative democratic basis for further governance. From the perspective of political communication, the process has succeeded, but how much the insight Macron gained from these gatherings with the citizens will really have a long-term effect on public policy is less certain.

Macron had to deal with several terrorist attacks in his first term, while at the same time trying to redefine specifically French secular politics, both in terms of integrating the Muslim population into society and in terms of the attitude of the French nation and culture toward Catholic heritage. The latter aspect was particularly visible at the time of the fire in Notre Dame, Paris. It is not yet completely clear what Macron’s new vision of the relationship between the public and the private, as well as the sacred and the profane, is. In addition, domestic identity disputes were shaken by a new influx of unregulated migration, to which Macron eventually responded with tighter security measures, signaling a general departure not only from his country but from the Union as a whole from the open-door policy towards immigration.

Terrorist threats have meanwhile subsided, but France has found itself embroiled in a series of counter-terrorism missions in the former colonies in the Sahel. After Brexit and the departure of Angela Merkel, Macron tried to fill the gap at the European level and revive France’s hope for its own leadership in Europe. Through a process of debating the future of Europe and reviving Eurofederalist ideas, the Elysée tried to give new impetus to the new Napoleonic moment – what the Corsican lost in the Brussels suburbs would be gained through the creation of a European defense force and deeper integration. On the eve of the Russian invasion, Macron tried a kind of shuttle diplomacy towards the Kremlin that did not bear fruit. The ideas of deeper integration with the federalist slant necessarily brought with it a sharper stance towards further enlargement – the leading figure of the French politics disappointed the potential member state with the offer of alternative or comforting membership – of the European political community, as well as clear indications that it may be decades before some aspirants are embraced in the circle of European stars.

According to a survey by the French branch of Ipsos, a third of those who did not vote in the second round believe that neither Macron nor Le Pen reflect their beliefs. For Macron, it is not very encouraging to find that in the second round there was a negative vote again, i.e. casting a vote to prevent an unwanted outcome (42 percent of respondents who voted for him wanted to prevent Le Pen’s victory), and not because Macron was considered the best choice (58 percent of respondents who voted for him). At the beginning of his new five years at the helm of France, twenty percent of respondents feel relieved, while the same percentages of voters feel indifferent and deceived. It is also instructive that 57 percent of the respondents believe that in the second term the president should work on the unification of the country, even if it means that some of their reform ideas must be put in the background. At the same time, over forty percent support the current ideological direction, i.e. they do not want it to turn either to the left or to the right.

Since the presidential term was reduced from seven to five, starting from the presidential election in 2002, the possibility of cohabitation has been significantly reduced, as the person who wins the presidential election usually manages to win a parliamentary majority two months later, i.e. the parties that support the president win the most of the seats in the National Assembly. However, speaking of Macron’s party, La République marche (“The Republic on the Move”), only 26 percent of respondents want to strengthen in the upcoming parliamentary elections, compared to 39 percent who want the same scenario for Mélenchon’s La France insoumise (“Unconquered France”) and 38 for Marine Le Pen’s Le Rassemblement National (“The National Rally”).

Perhaps the most interesting fact from Ipsos’ research is that 56 percent of respondents want Macron to lose the parliamentary majority leading to the so-called cohabitation. Almost the same percentage (57) of voters want to unite the left, i.e. to see the joint candidates in the National Assembly elections, compared to 35 percent who want to see a joint appearance of the far right (Le Pen and Éric Zemmour). Cohabitation is something France has not seen since the parallel mandates of President Chirac (Gaullist) and Prime Minister Jospin (Socialist) between 1997 and 2002. Whether Macron will indeed lose the parliamentary majority and have to work with the united left front and its government remains to be seen, but the indication that citizens are ready to support the cohabitation situation is a warning to Macron that casts a shadow over his lofty ideas for a new term.

Annals of the Croatian Political Science Association

Croatian Political Science Association
Faculty of Political Science
Lepušićeva 6, 10 000 Zagreb

email: anali@fpzg.hr
SCImago Journal & Country Rank
Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva ℗ 2024 Sva prava pridržana
en_US
linkedin facebook pinterest youtube rss twitter instagram facebook-blank rss-blank linkedin-blank pinterest youtube twitter instagram