The surprise attack by Hamas on October 7, 2023 on Israel, in which about 1,200 people were killed and about 250 kidnapped and taken to the Gaza Strip, led to a disproportionate military response by Israel and a humanitarian disaster. It is estimated that over 30,000 people have died in Gaza so far. The eyes of the world public were once again focused on the central conflict in the Middle East – the Arab-Israeli, or Palestinian-Israeli conflict in which many Arab states are involved to a greater or lesser extent.
What is surprising is the great misunderstanding of the historical context, the actors in the conflict, but also of the Middle East region itself, expressed within the numerous debates and statements that have overwhelmed the world public. Thus, for example, one could hear in the media a firm condemnation of Hamas as an organization almost identical to Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, while others represented a romanticized view of Hamas as freedom fighters against a much stronger oppressor.
But what is the political ideology of Hamas? Hamas expressed its ideological positions in two official documents – its Charters from 1988 and 2017. Hamas, or the Islamic Resistance Movement, has its roots in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the first contemporary Islamist organization in the world. Hamas refers to this fact in its Charter from 1988. So, to answer the question about political ideology, we must answer the question of what Islamism is. According to the influential German political scientist born in Damascus, Bassam Tibi, Islamism is a contemporary totalitarian political ideology whose goal is the establishment of a state based on Sharia, that is, an Islamic state. It is totalitarian because it is not content with controlling opinions and beliefs in the public sphere but demands control in the private sphere as well. Islamism appears in two variants, namely jihadism and institutional Islamism. Jihadism wants to come to power through violence and create an Islamic state, while institutional Islamism wants to do it through democratic elections. But the goal remains the same – the establishment of an Islamic state.
Tibi believes that Islamism has several ideological themes. First, it deals with the issue of the establishment of an Islamic state, and then the establishment of an international Islamic order. Second, the constitutional foundation of an Islamic state should be Sharia. Third, the jihadists advocate a kind of world revolution. Such jihadism differs from classical jihad, which was a regular war on the battlefield with rules, rather than a war against all possible targets, including civilian ones. Finally, anti-Semitism is very pronounced among Islamists, which, according to Tibi, was imported from Europe and precedes the conflict with Israel. Namely, Tibi claims that the “necessity” of the Islamists to fight the Jews who want to rule the world originated from the adoption of these ideas from the falsified Protocols of the Elders of Zion published in 1903, i.e. long before the creation of the State of Israel.
Which of these ideological themes can be found in Hamas charters? Has there been a change from 1988 to 2017, that is, has Hamas to a certain extent or completely abandoned its Islamist sign? It is not impossible. For example, the Tunisian Ennahda abandoned Islamism as its ideological roots at the party’s 10th Congress in 2016, although it too built its historical ideological foundations on the political thought of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Hamas Charter from 1988 at the very beginning refers to the words of Hasan al-Bana, the first murshid or leader of the (Egyptian) Muslim Brotherhood: “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam erases it, as it erased others before it.” The text further rejects peace initiatives and, on several occasions, very clearly calls not only to the destruction of the State of Israel but also to the killing of Jews: “Judgment Day will not come until the Muslims fight the Jews (kill the Jews), until the Jews hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say: O Muslims, O Abdullah, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him.” It should be noted that this quote in the Charter was taken from the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad. As the Charter states, jihad against Israel is the duty of every Muslim on a global level, not just Palestinians, so it seems from the above that the undoubted anti-Semitism of the Charter does not have its roots solely in the adoption of European ideas.
Jihadism is also a prominent theme of the Charter. For Hamas, there is no solution to the Palestinian issue without jihad. Jihad is the goal of Hamas, and it should be carried out in three concentric circles – Palestinian, Arab and Islamic. As already stated, jihad against the Jewish usurpation of Palestine is the duty of every Muslim, and it is necessary to “raise the banner of jihad”. Although in Art. 31. the Charter states that “Islam, Christianity and Judaism – can coexist in peace and quiet with each other”, it is understood that this is under the auspices of Islam as the ruling religion.
As for other topics, the Charter states in Art. 1. that Hamas’s “political program is Islam”, and in Art. 8. that its “constitution is the Koran”. In Art. 11. it is further stated that the Palestinian land should be governed by Sharia law, and that anything contrary to Sharia, as far as Palestine is concerned, is null and void. These are typical ideological themes for Islamism, that is, it is claimed that Hamas’s ideology is Islam, the Koran is seen as the basis of constitutionalism, and there is an aspiration to establish a political order based on Sharia law. In other words, at least according to the 1988 Charter, Hamas can rightly be said to be a truly Islamist organization.
The 2017 charter is more moderate. In the text of the Charter, there is no explicit call for violence against Jews, as is the case in the Charter from 1988. However, in Art. 1. The Charter states that the goal of the organization is to continue to liberate Palestine from the Zionist project, that is, the State of Israel. Immediately in Art. 2. states the borders of Palestine and that it stretches from the banks of the Jordan River in the west to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea in the east, while in art. 10. states that Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine. This means that it extends entirely through the territory of Israel.
The Charter claims that Hamas is aware of anti-Semitism and the persecution of Jews but considers it primarily a part of European rather than Arab and Islamic history. In Art. 16 of the Charter, it is claimed that Hamas is not in conflict with the Jews because of their religion but is primarily in conflict with the Zionists who occupied Palestine, and in Art. 19. it is very explicitly stated that “there will be no recognition of the legitimacy of the Zionist entity”, i.e. no recognition of Israel. In other words, Hamas still believes that the establishment of the State of Israel is completely illegal, which is a position that significantly complicates a peace solution and the eventual path towards a two-state solution.
Jihad is mentioned in the text of the Charter only once in the context of the legitimate right of Palestinians to fight for the liberation of Palestine. At the same time, this Charter states that the duty of not only the Palestinians, but also of the entire umma, i.e. the world community of Muslim believers, is the liberation of Palestine. Also, the text claims that Hamas will not give up armed struggle as one of the methods of struggle for liberation.
Other parts of the new Charter are also written more moderately. Thus, Islam is no longer considered the fundamental ideology of Hamas, but a frame of reference. Also, Islam is considered a religion of peace and tolerance that does not conflict with other beliefs. In the articles dealing with the political system of Palestine (Articles 27-34), it is clearly stated that it should be based on pluralism and democracy. Sharia law is not mentioned once, and there are no more references to the Muslim Brotherhood.
From the text of the new Charter, it could be concluded that, similarly to Ennahda in Tunisia, Hamas rejected the Islamist sign. However, elections have not been held in Gaza since 2006, so according to Bassam Tibi, it could be concluded that Hamas views democracy only as a procedure by which it comes to power. Also, in the West Bank, where the secular Fatah is in power, there have been no elections since 2006. But in our context, more importantly, how to explain the attack on October 7 in the light of the two charters?
In Art. 26. it is claimed that Hamas can use the escalation and de-escalation of the conflict as a method of resistance and struggle against the occupation. The extreme escalation can partly be attributed to the Abrahamic agreements, that is, the open rapprochement between Israel and a part of the Arab countries. Hamas must have interpreted this as a betrayal of its Arab and Islamic allies. These agreements are a “litmus test” that should lead to an official rapprochement between Riyadh and Tel Aviv. At the same time, such a new constellation of forces is directed against Iran as one of the biggest patrons of Hamas. If Hamas, under the auspices of Iran, tried to force the Arab states to abandon the foreign policy course of mutual rapprochement, this strategy has so far proved to be a failure. As in the case of the elections, the actions of Hamas can also be attributed to the fact that they have not sincerely given up the Islamist ideology. Tibi states that “double talk” is common among Islamists, that is, one thing is said for the needs of the international audience, while a completely different message is addressed to supporters. According to such an interpretation of events, Hamas did not give up anti-Semitism and jihadism. In any case, even according to the new Charter, Hamas is not inclined to recognize Israel.
Under such conditions, Israel has no possibility of political cooperation with Hamas that would lead to a more lasting peace. There is also a big problem in the actions of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, which continues the policy of right-wing Zionism. Although it is not disputed that Israel has the right to self-defense, the disparity in the response, the number of civilian casualties and the scale of the destruction makes it impossible for the Palestinian side to attempt to enter into serious peace negotiations. The peace studies literature agrees that the possibilities for peaceful conflict resolution are very slim when positions on both sides are this deeply entrenched. It is still not clear which actors on both sides will lead any future constructive negotiations. Until that moment, unfortunately, many more civilians will be killed, and even greater material damage will be caused.
